Khamenei rides a storm in a tea cup
By M K Bhadrakumar
Western capitals must make a difficult choice: how long to
pin hopes on the eruption of a "color" revolution in
The
barricades on the frontline of any attempt to prise open
the Iranian regime at this delicate point in Middle Eastern
politics.
century at least any such American folly, and the Barack
Obama administration has no intentions of committing
hara-kiri, either.
Within
of the light brigade. No country seems to want to be seen
up front - except the
since it currently chairs the rotating European Union
presidency. But then, most European countries would
probably seldom fail the chance to be
but will, true to a pattern, swiftly fall back the moment
they estimate that the law of diminishing returns is at
work and continued tirades might jeopardize lucrative
commercial interests in
Tens of thousands of supporters of defeated presidential
candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi planned to keep up their
street protests in
authorities have promised a partial recount of Friday's
vote that saw incumbent Mahmud Ahmadinejad win another
four-year term.
No scope for a color revolution
experience in staging color revolutions. This has been the
forte of the Americans - conceptualized in the post-Soviet
space in
subsequently grasped by the neo-conservatives in the George
W Bush team. Europeans were curious bystanders in
been on the inside track over
turned out to be a mish-mash.
At any rate, to borrow Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin's
famous words in a philosophical context, staging a color
revolution in
are that the color revolution struggling to be born on the
streets of
participation at the summit meeting of the
Cooperation Organization (SCO) at
Tuesday was possible only with the tacit acquiescence of
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. It was an important decision
to take at a critical juncture. Earlier reports in the
Western media speculated that Ahmadinejad might stand down
in view of the developing political situation.
Evidently, the regime decided that
way project an atmosphere of crisis as that would only play
into the hands of the proponents of a color revolution
within
dissident Ibrahim Yazdi, "Certainly, the gap inside
politically, will be widened. Our main concern is how to
keep the enthusiasm that was created for the election
alive, in order to monitor and constrain the power of the
government. The only way to counter it is the power of the
people. We need to organize them."
How is the regime coping? Clearly, Khamenei is in the
driving seat and is in control of the state apparatus. He
is skillfully navigating the regime through the choppy
waters. Khamenei's meeting with the principal opposition
candidate in the election, Mousavi, merits attention. The
official statement makes out certain key points. First,
Khamenei indicated unambiguously to Mousavi that the regime
would not tolerate any street protests and he must
therefore "channel protests through legal bodies". It now
becomes extremely difficult for Mousavi to be seen as
defying the Supreme Leader's diktat.
Second, Khamenei suggested that there was nothing
extraordinary about the present situation, insofar as "in
previous elections also, there were some people and
candidates who had some problems". But they pursued the
matter through the Guardians Council, which in any case has
to approve the conduct of the presidential election in
Mousavi's existential choice However, it is the third point
made by Khamenei that is most crucial. He pointed a finger
at the "enemies' provocative actions" as well as "certain
behind-the-stage plots" which aimed to "create chaos in
Mousavi that "your [Mousavi's] character is different from
such people and it is necessary that you pursue the
problems through calm".
The highly personal remark had a touch of admonition, but
also the hint of a fulsome invitation to reasoning that
could open up doors leading into pleasant pathways along
which the two interlocutors known to each other for long,
after all, could take a stroll. It was a very Persian
remark.
Khamenei virtually reminded Mousavi of their old
association, when the latter served as
minister under him and the two were not only close
comrades-in-arms for the preservation of the Iranian
revolution through the critical years of the Iran-Iraq war
in the 1980s but also worked together to frustrate the
cunning ploys of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who as the
powerful speaker of the Majlis (parliament) constantly
conspired to arrogate state power.
During that period, Rafsanjani constantly sniped at Mousavi
and tried to undercut him, although he enjoyed Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini's endorsement. On numerous occasions,
Rafsanjani gave him hell on the floor of the Majlis,
embarrassing him when he sought parliamentary approval for
his moves, whittling down his authority to execute his
policy and systematically undermining his political
standing in public opinion.
Rafsanjani had already begun jockeying for position in
expectation of the post-Khomeini era. As Khomeini fell ill,
Rafsanjani became more assertive. Mousavi, in fact, found
himself identifying with the Iranian revolutionaries (like
Ahmadinejad), who were appalled by Rafsanjani's suggestion
to Khomeini to "drink from the chalice of poison" and order
a ceasefire to end the Iran-Iraq war that effectively meant
allowing Saddam Hussein the escape route. Those were
tumultuous times when the fate of the Iranian revolution of
1979 hung by a thread.
The main sticking point was the economic policy of the
Mousavi government. Rafsanjani sought a policy that catered
to the
members as well as large sections of the corrupt clergy,
who were aligned with him. But Mousavi opted for state
control of the economy and insisted he was acting in
accordance with the ideals of the revolution and Khomeini's
wishes. What Rafsanjani proposed during those difficult
years was to have the latitude for his clan and other
hangers-on to do some war profiteering. Mousavi's answer
was a firm "no", and he stuck to the austere economic
policy.
When the eight-year war with
Rafsanjani proposed that
revolutionary ideals and take Western help for
reconstruction. (The Rafsanjani family initially made its
fortune by exporting Iranian products such as pistachio
nuts and carpets to the
and refused to go against the grain of the revolution.
Finally, when the levers of power were passed into his
hands as president, Rafsanjani's wrath knew no bounds.
Vindictive by nature, he literally drove Mousavi into
political exile. The ex-prime minister summarily abandoned
politics and returned to his profession of architecture and
teaching.
Thus, Khamenei all but jogged Mousavi's memory at their
meeting in
join hands with Rafsanjani against him. He suggested that
Rafsanjani and his circles are simply using him as a
political ladder. Khamenei virtually reminded Mousavi of
his old constituency. Indeed, as prime minister (1981-89),
Mousavi had an impeccable reputation as a hardliner - every
bit as much as the "international community" regards
Ahmadinejad today. In a memorable article penned in 1988,
the Economist magazine described him as a "firm radical".
Khamenei folded up his conversation with Mousavi by
"admiring" the massive turnout in Friday's election and
"once again underlining its healthy and calm nature". In a
subtle way, he allowed Mousavi to have a peep into his
thought processes about the current situation.
Meanwhile, Khamenei has directed the Guardians Council to
review the appeals about the election and to give its
opinion within a week to 10 days. He also held a joint
meeting with the representatives of the four candidates in
the election and officials from the 12-member Guardians
Council and the Interior Ministry. At the meeting, Khamenei
used harsh language describing the street protesters as
"vandals" for damaging state property. He told the
candidates' supporters to distance themselves from the
"vandals" and to support peace in the country as the
election "should not cause divisions".
Khamenei added, "If the election result had been different,
even then such incidents would have occurred" as "some
people" are against the unity of the Iranian nation and the
solidarity of the Islamic system. He offered that a partial
recount of the votes in the elections could be arranged, if
necessary. But he concluded by passing his own judgment,
"Those in charge of supervising the elections are always
trustworthy people."
European attempts to interfere. This has been done at the
appropriate diplomatic level with the Foreign Ministry
calling in the envoys of
and the
particularly the
interfering in
the government and giving media support to the enemy
groups, rioters and social and political hooligans who are
trying to fuel chaos in the Islamic Republic".
All in all, therefore, Western capitals will take note that
the hope that a color revolution might overturn
Ahmadinejad's victory or in a best-case scenario lead to
the toppling of the Iranian regime is far-fetched and
almost fanciful. The extent of the street protests has come
down in
that there would be a countrywide popular uprising seems
also to be far-fetched.
If Rafsanjani's astute political temperament is any guide,
he will lie very low and generally avoid being noticed for
a while. Meanwhile, he will do some intense networking with
his contacts in the power apparatus, putting out his
extraordinary political antennae and making a careful
assessment as to the scope for compromise with the powers
that be and when he should make his move. He should first
live to fight another day. That may require making
compromises. After all, politics is the art of the
possible. So, without batting an eyelid, he may turn his
back on Mousavi and former president Mohammed Khatami, who
were, after all, his temporary allies in the recent saga.
Will he get another chance? That is a big question. Time
seems to have run out for Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad has
repeatedly projected an "anti-corruption" drive as a major
plank of his new presidency. Was that mere election
rhetoric, or will he go for the Rafsanjani family, which
has many skeletons in its cupboard? Everything depends on
what Khamenei thinks. He may assess that this time the
"Shark" went too far to plot a lethal attack that might
have succeeded. Or, he might let bygones be bygones.
Rafsanjani is undoubtedly the West's favorite poster boy
-and of the "pro-West" Arab authoritarian rulers in the
region. The difficult choice for European capitals is how
much propaganda mileage to extract at this stage before
moving on. Once US-Iranian engagement begins, European
companies will scramble for oil contracts. If the European
fighting chance to materialize, that will depend primarily
on gaining access to Iranian gas.
Also, European capitals will have noted that there is great
reticence on the part of Middle Eastern countries to point
fingers at
democracy. Autocratic Arab regimes will be nervous that if
the contagious disease of the color revolution were to
appear in
Eastern political landscape. Unsurprisingly, the lone
exception has been
has a vested interest in scuttling US-Iran engagement and
will not easily pass up an opportunity to malign
Ahmadinejad.
On the other hand, three important neighbors of
-
Ahmadinejad, quite ahead of protocol requirements to do so.
Ahmadinejad was warmly greeted at the SCO summit, too.
"
political poles attending the [SCO] summit ... [They] play
important roles in dealing with the world's current and
upcoming developments," Ahmadinejad was reported as saying
in the People's Daily and it also highlighted Ahmadinejad's
tirade against the "unipolar world order" in his speech. On
its part,
Iranian elections are the internal affair of
welcome the fact that elections took place, we welcome the
new president on Russian soil and see it as symbolic that
he made his first visit [as newly-elected president] to
relations." Russian President Dmitry Medvedev scheduled a
bilateral with Ahmadinejad at Yekaterinburg.
Khamenei has made it clear in recent weeks that the Obama
administration will meet a resolute interlocutor when
US-Iran direct negotiations begin shortly. No amount of
Western pressure tactics on the democracy plank is going to
soften up Khamenei. With Ahmadinejad continuing as
president for a second term, Khamenei has his chosen team
in position.
The Obama administration faces difficult choices. The stir
in
thing has ever happened there, despite the best efforts of
former
for well over four years for triggering "regime change".
The
in
trigger convulsions in popular moods was studied. The
State Department confirmed on Tuesday it had contacted
Twitter to urge it to delay a planned upgrade that would
have cut daytime service to Iranians. But a department
spokesman denied that the contacts with Twitter amounted to
meddling in
causing annoyance to the Iranian regime is self-evident.
At the same time, Obama has to worry that unrest in
may scuttle his plans to commence direct engagement with
must face the music from the influential
the
the pedal hard enough on a color revolution in
Obama is treading softly. He said late on Tuesday there
appeared to be no policy differences between Ahmadinejad
and Mousavi. "The difference between Ahmadinejad and
Mousavi in terms of their actual policies may not be as
great as has been advertised. Either way, we are going to
be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically
been hostile to the
That's a cleverly drafted formulation. Prima facie, Obama
pleases the regime in
"stand-offish" as to what ensues through the coming days by
way of the street protests or out of the deliberations of
hand, Obama also is smartly neutralizing any allegation
that the Rafsanjani-Khatami-Mousavi phenomenon is in any
way to be branded by the Iranian regime as "pro-US".
Obama's remark helps the Iranian opposition to maintain
that its motivations are purely driven by
interests.
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